Yesterday’s post was old news for this web site, because most of the following information was posted well over a year ago.
Marine General Anthony Zinni established his impeccable credentials during nearly forty years of military service. After retirement, he served as Colin Powell’s special envoy to the Middle East, before disagreements over the Iraq war and its probable aftermath caused him to resign. Zinni is quoted by Tom Clancy in "Battle Ready;" a segment entitled "The Obligation to Speak the Truth."
Zinni says: "In the lead-up to the Iraq war and its later conduct, I saw at minimum, true dereliction, negligence and irresponsibility; at worst, lying, incompetence, and corruption. False rationales presented as justification; a flawed strategy; lack of planning; the unnecessary alienation of our allies; the underestimation of the task; the unnecessary distraction from real threats, and the unbearable strain dumped on our overstretched military, all of these caused me to speak out."
For speaking out Zinni was called a traitor and a turncoat by Pentagon officials. Zinni strongly disagrees with the mentality which says: "As long as guys are dying out there, it is morally reprehensible to criticize the flawed policies and tactics that put them into the predicaments."
Career counterterrorism expert Richard Clarke served under four presidents beginning as an analyst on nuclear weapons under Reagan and established a record for continuous service in national security policy positions.
In his book "Against All Enemies, Clarke wrote: “We invaded and occupied an oil rich Arab country that posed no threat to us...We delivered to al Qaeda the greatest recruitment propaganda imaginable.” On 9/11, Clarke was the nations crisis manager in Bush’s White House situation room. He reports that within hours of the 9/11 attack, Donald Rumsfeld was suggesting Iraq as a battlefield. Not because al Qaeda was there, but because it offered "better targets" than the elusive bin Laden in Afghanistan.
In 1993, Clinton ordered cruise missiles launched against Iraqi intelligence headquarters. Initially, Clarke was disappointed that the response had been so small. Ten years later he wrote: "U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities never developed any evidence of further Iraqi support for terrorism directed against Americans. Until we invaded Iraq in 2003."
Donald Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were among 18 signatures on a letter to then President Clinton in 1998, which urged a preemptive war against Saddam Hussein. Of the eighteen signers of the letter; eleven held post in the Bush administration, when Iraq was invaded. In Ron Suskin's "The Price of Loyalty" former Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill confirms that ten days after Bush's inauguration the focus at the first National Security Council meeting was war with Iraq.
In "See No Evil", Robert Baer wrote : "I knew enough about the way Washington worked to know that when it didn't like some piece of information it did everything in its power to discredit the messenger"... "The problem is the White House didn't go to the CIA and ask, tell me the truth, it said give me ammunition." Baer was a legendary CIA field officer, who served most of his 21 year career in the Middle East. In the movie "Syriana" the covert Arabic-speaking CIA agent played by George Clooney is partly based on the exploits of author Robert Baer.
Bush supporters continue to insist that it was erroneous intelligence by the CIA, which resulted in his administration being wrong about weapons of mass destruction and a link between Saddam and al Qaeda. CNN's special "Dead Wrong", sought to analyze the process by which the argument for a preemptive war was made. Several quotes from the program provide insight into how the process got it wrong.
"Policy makers love intelligence when it supports their policy and they have difficulty with intelligence when it does not. The spies call it cherry picking, choosing scraps of intelligence to prove a worst case scenario." - former CIA deputy director of operations James Pavitt.
"As they embellished what the intelligence community was prepared to say and as the press reported that information, it began to acquire its own sense of truth and reality."- Rand Beers - former National Security Council Official, who resigned his White House post to work against the reelection of Bush.
Former senior member of the U. S. intelligence community, Michael Scheuer, had two decades of experience in national security issues. While with the CIA, he wrote "Imperial Hubris" under the pseudonym Anonymous. Scheuer has said: "There was just a resignation within the agency that we were going to war against Iraq and it didn't make any difference what the analysis was or what kind of objections or countervailing forces there were to the invasion. We were going to war."
In "Imperial Hubris", Scheuer warned: "One of the greatest dangers for Americans in deciding how to confront the threat from al Qaeda lies in continuing to believe... Muslims hate us for what we think, rather than for what we do. We repeatedly hear: ( because they hate freedom ) from senior U.S. leaders. Such a conclusion is potentially fatal nonsense".
"Imperial Hubris explores why they hate us and why our policies and actions are bin Laden's only indispensable allies. Scheuer emphasizes:" We must recognize that our invasion of Iraq was not preemptive; it was an avarice, premeditated, unprovoked war against a foe who posed no immediate threat but whose defeat did offer economic advantages." He wrote "Imperial Hubris" with certainty that: "al Qaeda will attack the continental U. S. again, that its next strike will be more damaging than 9/11."
Paul Pillar is the first high level C.I.A. insider to speak out on the use of prewar intelligence. After 28 years with the C.I.A., Pillar retired in 2005, as senior intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia from 2000 to 2005. He charges the Bush administration with the selective use of intelligence about Iraq's unconventional weapons and of ignoring predictions of postwar chaos in Iraq.
Pillar wrote: “What is most remarkable about prewar intelligence on Iraq is not that it got things wrong and thereby misled policy makers; it is that it played so small a role in one of the most important policy decisions in decades.”... “It has become clear that official intelligence was not relied on in making even the most significant national security decisions, that intelligence was misused publicly to justify decisions already made.”... “If the entire body of official intelligence analysis on Iraq had a policy implication, it was to avoid war...or, if war was going to be launched, to prepare for a messy aftermath.”
Michael Parent's "Superpatriotism" points out: "We are told that during times of crisis we must trust the president. Democracy is not about trust; it's about distrust, accountability, public exposure and responsible government. We must enlist our fellow Americans to trust their leaders less and themselves more. Once fear takes hold, evidence becomes largely irrelevant."
Former Marine Captain Nathaniel Fick clarified Bush's "noble cause", in an interviewed with Lou Dobbs on CNN. Fick led infantry platoons in both Iraq and Afghanistan. While discussing his book "One Bullet Away", Fick stated: "U.S. involvement in the Middle East is a vital national interest. We need access to energy."
Dobbs responded: "You're being honest in that statement, as you are throughout your book. The honesty about the role of oil in our strategic national interest. Often a veil is put over it or it's ignored altogether."
Access to energy in the Middle East has been determined to be in our strategic national interest. The Bush regime had hoped the invasion of Iraq would guaranteed access to the world's second largest oil reserve. Bush knew being honest with the American people wouldn't work, so his propagandist fed us the following bullshit, to ensure support for the invasion of Iraq:
Colin Powell: "What we're giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence."
Dick Cheney: "There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction."
Condoleezza Rice: "Clearly, there are contacts between al Qaeda and Iraq that can be documented."
In 1960, the House Committee on Government Operations declared "Secrecy the first refuge of incompetents must be at bare minimum in a democratic society, for a fully informed public is the basis of self-government." Perhaps, we are no longer a democracy.
Sen. Robert Byrd quotes and Iraqi exile: "Getting rid of Saddam Hussein is one thing...But you won't find any self-respecting Iraqi prepared to cooperate with an American puppet regime."
Anthony Cordesman is a former intelligence analyst with the State and Defense Department, who specialized in Middle East issues. He believes Bush will refuse to give up on his effort to turn Iraq into a docile client state. Cordesman's "Inexcusable Failure" cautions: "all the training in the world will be for naught, if the Iraqi National Guard and Police are corrupt, or view their government as a puppet regime of American imperialist.”
Again, we find our country trapped again in a quicksand of lies. Hopefully, an examination of the role our president played in creating the predicament will serve the purpose of avoiding future "governmental misjudgements". Bush and his cabinet repeatedly claimed Saddam's weapons of mass destruction posed "a serious and mounting threat to our nation" with consequences that would be "grave and tragic" if we failed to act. We were repeatedly told that the Iraqi regime possessed "vast arsenals of deadly biological and chemical weapons". "We cannot wait for final proof, the smoking gun." "It could come in the form of a mushroom cloud."
Michael Parenti's "Superpatriotism" reports: "Chief UN arms inspector Hans Blix remarked that the White House maintained 100 percent certainty that the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction existed- based on zero percent evidence."
As in Vietnam, this was not governmental misjudgment, but again White House and Pentagon lies and deceit.
Some believe it’s unfair to say that the erroneous intelligence that led Congress to authorize the invasion of Iraq was George Tenet’s fault. They ask why none of the hundreds of people working at the CIA, who gather the intelligence never came forward to say anything in public.
Former CIA analyst Ray Mc Govern reports: “It saddens me greatly that no one quit. The answer is found in the fact that Tenet was the beneficiary of a whole generation of the politicization, and corruption of intelligence analysis. It started with Bill Casey under Ronald Reagan and by the time Tenet took office, he inherits a whole clique of malleable managers, who in effect said: “Yes, sir. If Dick Cheney says Iraq has nuclear capability, we can write that.”
According to Mc Govern, Tenet came back from the White House and said: “We can’t avoid preparing a national intelligence estimate, because Congress won’t vote for this war until we do one. We have to do it to the terms of reference of Dick Cheney’s speech of August 26, 2002, where Cheney claimed Saddam Hussein could have a nuclear weapon in a year; he has got all kinds of chemicals; he has got all kinds of biological weapons.” Mc Govern says: “It was totally dishonest, but they did it.”
Furthermore, Mc Govern points out that Jay Rockefeller, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee, tried to investigate a forged memo, which was apparently from the Italian embassy. The memo suggested that Niger was supplying nuclear material to Iraq. The Republican Senate majority chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Pat Roberts decided that would be inappropriate.
If you trace the memo back, and consider the characters that were involved, Mc Govern suspects that the memo would lead right to the doorstep of the vice president. He doesn’t claim it was forged by the vice president, but instead farmed out to a cottage industry of former intelligence agents, who did a rather amateurish job.