On election day most Americans will vote on electronic voting machines. Watchdog groups claim the guidelines allow for an acceptable failure rate for electronic voting machines are too high. They want the federal government to be more aggressive in setting standards, because the standards for electronic voting machines breaking down are dangerously lax. Presently, standards are merely recommendations, which puts the integrity of our democracy at risk.
Federal guidelines permit one failure every 163 hours. This is not acceptable, because it allows too many machines to fail on any given election day and be down for too long during that given day. We seem to care less about our voting machines than our ATM machines, since voting machines have a higher failure rate than ATM machines. No machinery should be allowed to be purchased or used for voting that doesn’t guaranteed mean time between failures of at least several thousand hours.
Computer experts point out that e-voting machine vendors have not put in routine safeguards found in other interactive computer products. Gaming systems like Sony Playstation 3 are engineered to resist a wide variety of tampering attacks because they want to make sure that every game played is legitimate and not pirated. That level of engineering is entirely absent from voting machines.
Hacker can change the outcome of an election without even touching the voting machines. Someone with a hand-held device like a Palm Pilot or other personal digital device could simply show up at a polling station beam a command into the machine and alter votes.
A panel of computer and election experts report: "The threat analysis shows that machines with wireless components are particularly vulnerable to software attack programs and other attacks." Nevertheless, vendors continue to manufacture and sell machines with wireless components.
Paper records for each voting machine are recommended, as well as random audits to check the systems. There's all sorts of ways that electronic voting machines can be affected using infrared ports and other wireless devices. Software can be changed, or the system can be infected with a virus. Some e-voting machines use commercially available computer components that have a wireless feature included. Experts say if that feature is dormant, it could be activated by a hacker. It’s possible to be sitting in a car across the street from the polling station and change the software on a voting machine.
The Help America Vote Act sets minimum guidelines, but doesn't say what kind of technology should be used or require how it should be verified. This is a national issue, because elections will take place and voters have no assurance whatsoever that these machines work, are tamper proof or that fraud will not occur.
The federal government, through the election assistance commission, should train local officials in how to do the right kind of audits of these voting systems. Furthermore, the federal government should be doing the kind of threat analysis that private groups and computer scientists have done.
Federal guidelines for designing and testing electronic voting machines were drafted by a federal advisory board in 2005. However, those standards are voluntary and won’t be officially in effect until December 2007. Requirements for a paper trail are not even in the federal guidelines. Computer engineers say those guidelines are not enough to actually check the machine that is in place at the polling station.
There's a groundswell of action to challenge electronic voting machines. In Colorado, half of the two million voters use electronic voting machines. A nonpartisan group of activists filed suit saying, state security testing was inadequate. The Colorado secretary of state had delegated the responsibility of security testing to the vendors. All that's required was for the vendors submit their documentation and recommendations and the secretary of state claimed that's good enough and approves the security of the machine. A Colorado judge ruled that the secretary of state's office violated state law and did an abysmal job in testing those machines prior to the midterm elections.
In Maryland, after a botched primary in September, Governor Ehrlich wants to dump the electronic voting machines and go with paper ballots. The electronic voter records kept crashing. He said that in the ensuing chaos, people standing in long lines were discouraged from voting. Ehrlich believes instead of taking a risk in November, Maryland should go low-tech and err on the side of safety. That way voters get an election, which everybody can count on, and perhaps go higher-tech next time.
California was among the first states to require a voter verified paper trail in case a recount is needed. In 2004, California decertified certain Diebold machines and demanded those models be put through stricter security and reliability tests before they could be used. The state also demanded stricter federal testing.
In New Mexico, the governor said he wanted to restore confidence in elections and simply gave up on touch screen technology. Last March, Governor Richardson signed a law to require an all paper ballot.
New Jersey Democrat Russ Holt and 190 other members of the House of Representatives have signed on to legislation to ban wireless connections for all electronic voting machines. Holt says it is not too late to intervene for the November elections, but time is running out. These voting systems have significant security and reliability vulnerabilities which pose a real danger to the integrity of national and state elections.
The Federal Oversight Committee on Elections allows wireless voting technology, but not all members are convinced it’s safe. Prudently, New York and Minnesota have banned voting machines with wireless technology.
The New York State League of Women Voters support optical scans, which have already established and good track record.