Consequences of Losing
American policymakers and intelligence analysts are considering the potential repercussions of failure in Iraq. Over forty years ago, policymakers were thinking about the implications of defeat in Vietnam.
In 1965, Under Secretary of State George Ball recommended that we cut our losses in Vietnam. He had recognized the quagmire, but LBJ was looking to bring our troops home with honor and save his legacy. While, LBJ was trying to save his legacy and additional fifty-five thousand Americans died.
In 1967, CIA Director Richard Helms asked for a review of strategic consequences of an American failure in Vietnam. A classified memorandum entitled “Implications of an Unfavorable Outcome in Vietnam”, detailed a list of worrisome prospects.
Shortly thereafter, the Tet Offensive, by North Vietnamese soldiers and Vietcong guerrillas, caught U.S. forces and the American public by surprise. Gen. William Westmoreland, the U.S. commander in Vietnam, was replaced and our strategy shifted from conventional operations to counterinsurgency. However, the shift in strategy came too late to alter the outcome of the war. From 1967 to 1975, when the withdrawal was completed thirty thousand additional Americans were killed in Vietnam.
Please, consider these excerpts from the document “Implications of an Unfavorable Outcome in Vietnam”, but with the word Iraq replacing the word Vietnam:
1. At some stage in most debates about the Iraq war, questions like the following emerge: What would it actually mean for the US if it failed to achieve its stated objectives in Iraq? Are our vital interests in fact involved? Would abandonment of the effort really generate other serious dangers?
2. What we are attempting in this paper is to provide some greater precision about the probable costs, for American policy and interests as a whole, of an unfavorable outcome Iraq. It is not assumed in this inquiry that such an outcome is now likely; it has been demonstrated, in fact, that the insurgents cannot win if the US is determined to prevent it. But the question of what it would mean for the US if its own objectives are not achieved is relevant and fair. The debate itself shows the need for a sounder basis by which to measure the costs of an unfavorable outcome against the exertions which would presumably still be required to achieve a favorable one.
Unfavorable outcomes were very apparent in 1965 and 1967, but young Americans continued to die by the ten’s of thousands, while a foolish debate dragged on. Obviously, politicians don't have a sense of urgency, when it comes to the lives of our troops.
In 1965, Under Secretary of State George Ball recommended that we cut our losses in Vietnam. He had recognized the quagmire, but LBJ was looking to bring our troops home with honor and save his legacy. While, LBJ was trying to save his legacy and additional fifty-five thousand Americans died.
In 1967, CIA Director Richard Helms asked for a review of strategic consequences of an American failure in Vietnam. A classified memorandum entitled “Implications of an Unfavorable Outcome in Vietnam”, detailed a list of worrisome prospects.
Shortly thereafter, the Tet Offensive, by North Vietnamese soldiers and Vietcong guerrillas, caught U.S. forces and the American public by surprise. Gen. William Westmoreland, the U.S. commander in Vietnam, was replaced and our strategy shifted from conventional operations to counterinsurgency. However, the shift in strategy came too late to alter the outcome of the war. From 1967 to 1975, when the withdrawal was completed thirty thousand additional Americans were killed in Vietnam.
Please, consider these excerpts from the document “Implications of an Unfavorable Outcome in Vietnam”, but with the word Iraq replacing the word Vietnam:
1. At some stage in most debates about the Iraq war, questions like the following emerge: What would it actually mean for the US if it failed to achieve its stated objectives in Iraq? Are our vital interests in fact involved? Would abandonment of the effort really generate other serious dangers?
2. What we are attempting in this paper is to provide some greater precision about the probable costs, for American policy and interests as a whole, of an unfavorable outcome Iraq. It is not assumed in this inquiry that such an outcome is now likely; it has been demonstrated, in fact, that the insurgents cannot win if the US is determined to prevent it. But the question of what it would mean for the US if its own objectives are not achieved is relevant and fair. The debate itself shows the need for a sounder basis by which to measure the costs of an unfavorable outcome against the exertions which would presumably still be required to achieve a favorable one.
Unfavorable outcomes were very apparent in 1965 and 1967, but young Americans continued to die by the ten’s of thousands, while a foolish debate dragged on. Obviously, politicians don't have a sense of urgency, when it comes to the lives of our troops.
0 Comments:
Post a Comment
<< Home