“This War is Lost”
Recently, Secretary of Defense Gates stated: “The debate in Congress has been helpful in demonstrating to the Iraqis that American patience is limited. The strong feeling expressed in the Congress about the timetable probably has had a positive impact in terms of communicating to the Iraqis that this is not an open-ended commitment.”
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid said this war is lost. The statement is consistent with public opinion, which believes this war needs to be ended as quickly as possible.
Sixty percent of Americans say they side with Democrats in Congress. Thirty-seven percent of Americans say if Bush vetoes the Iraq funding bill, Congress should pass another bill without a timetable, and the same 37 percent want to keep forces in Iraq as long as they’re need. Therefore, Democrats speak for the more than 60 percent of Americans who disagree with the stay the course mentality.
In 2005, retired Lt. Gen. William Odom, who used to head the National Security Agency said the only way to stabilize the Middle East is to leave Iraq. Odom wrote that if Bush wants to bring democracy and stability to the Middle East, the only way to achieve that goal is for the US armed forces to get out of Iraq now.
Odom, is a highly respected military analysts and a prominent figure at the conservative Hudson Institute in Washington. He insists that Iraq is the worst place to fight a battle for regional stability and that the invasion of Iraq didn’t serve our interests. It turns out that Iran and al Qaeda benefited the most, and that continues to be true every day US forces remain there.
General Odom was right, it’s the greatest strategic blunder in American history. History teaches us that if we understand ourselves and true to our own national values, the prerequisites for cultural understanding are minimized. This war and the way in which we moved into Iraq are in violation of our national values.
The military situation has deteriorated to the point it’s undeniable, that this thing is not going to be won in military terms. We are not going to shoot our way into making peace between warring religious factions that have been going at it for half a millennium.
General Odom was not alone in his criticism of the invasion of Iraq. For the first time in history, numerous generals challenged the competence of the Secretary of Defense and Commander-in-Chief.
The Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki, when President Bush was elected, accurately informed Congress that the occupation of Iraq would require something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers. Shinseki's estimate was publicly dismissed by Pentagon officials. He had the courage to challenge Rumfeld’s downsizing plans, which would have made a big difference as we began reconstruction. Rumsfeld retaliated by naming General Shinseki's successor more than a year before his scheduled retirement, effectively undercutting his authority. The rest of the senior brass got the message, and have been reluctant to complained since.
Retired Gen. Wesley Clark predicted that the unilateral invasion of Iraq would supercharge recruiting for Al Qaeda.
Retired Marine Lt. Gen. Gregory Newbold a former director of operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff said: “My sincere view is that the commitment of our forces to this fight was done with a casualness and swagger that are the special province of those who have never had to execute these missions or bury the results.”
Retired Marine General Anthony Zinni established his impeccable credentials during nearly forty years of military service. After retirement, he served as Colin Powell's special envoy to the Middle East, before disagreements over the Iraq war and its probable aftermath caused him to resign. In “Battle Ready”; a segment entitled “The Obligation to Speak the Truth”, Zinni said: “In the lead-up to the Iraq war and its later conduct, I saw at minimum, true dereliction, negligence and irresponsibility; at worst, lying, incompetence, and corruption. False rationales presented as justification; a flawed strategy; lack of planning; the unnecessary alienation of our allies; the underestimation of the task; the unnecessary distraction from real threats, and the unbearable strain dumped on our overstretched military, all of these caused me to speak out.”
For speaking out Zinni was called a traitor and a turncoat by Pentagon officials. Zinni strongly disagrees with the mentality which says: “As long as guys are dying out there, it is morally reprehensible to criticize the flawed policies and tactics that put them into the predicaments.”
On October 10 2002, Zinni a former chief of U.S. Central Command repeated points he'd made during the run-up to war: “If we think there is a fast solution to changing the governance of Iraq, then we don't understand history, the nature of the country, the divisions or the underneath suppressed passions that could rise up.” It was Zinni who predicted that the Iraqi Army and security forces might melt away after the state apparatus self-destructed, leading to chaos.
Recently Zinni said: “Poor military judgment has been used throughout this mission. In my case, I was retired by the time this started, but I took issue with the faulty planning, the overoptimistic assumptions, trusting the exiles, bad decisions on the ground, inability to secure the borders; all sorts of mistakes that should not have happened, that good, common sense military judgment should not have let happen. You have one of two choices: either you speak out or you leave. If you decide to leave after you're heard and your advice not accepted, you're just going to be replaced. Somebody else is going to come in.”
Lt. Gen. Newbold and Gen. Zinni had seen the lack of planning beforehand but, Maj. Generals; Paul Eaton and John Batiste experienced the effects of the bad decisions right on the ground.
Retired Army Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton commanded the training of Iraqi security forces until 2004. He has written that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is not competent to lead our armed forces. Eaton points out that Rumsfeld's failure to build coalitions with our traditional allies, by dismissively refering to them as "old Europe". “Thus, he imposed far greater demands and risks on our military than necessary. Furthermore, he alienated our own military, by ignoring the advice of seasoned officers and denying subordinates any chance for input.” Eaton calls for Mr. Rumsfeld to step down, because: “He has shown himself incompetent strategically, operationally and tactically, and is far more than anyone responsible for what has happened to our important mission in Iraq.”
Since, Rumsfeld has presided over the Pentagon, there is a growing reluctance by experienced military men and civilians to challenge his decisions. Rumsfeld rejected the Powell Doctrine of overwhelming force and sent in just enough troops to complete the ground war against the uniformed Iraqis.
Retired Maj. Gen. John Batiste led the First Infantry Division in Iraq said: “When decisions are made without taking into account sound military recommendations, sound military decision-making, sound planning, then we're bound to make mistakes.” Batiste supports civilian control of the military, but says: “We went to war with a flawed plan that didn't account for the hard work to build the peace after we took down the regime. We also served under a Secretary of Defense who didn't understand leadership, who was abusive, who was arrogant, who didn't build a strong team.”
Retired Army Maj. Gen. Charles Swannack commanded the 82nd Airborne in Iraq stated: “I really believe that we need a new secretary of defense because Secretary Rumsfeld carries way too much baggage with him.” Swannack criticised Rumsfeld's management style: “He has micromanaged the generals who are leading our forces there; he has culpability associated with the Abu Ghraib prison scandal and rather than admitting these mistakes, he continually justifies them to the press.” Swannack, who served more than 30 years in the Army and also criticized the way the war was being run before he retired. In May 2004, while still on active duty, Swannack told the Washington Post that he thought the United States was losing strategically in Iraq.
Retired Army Maj. Gen. John Riggs the former director of Objective Force Task Force claimed: "They only need the military advice when it satisfies their agenda. I think that's a mistake, and that's why I think he should resign."
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid said this war is lost. The statement is consistent with public opinion, which believes this war needs to be ended as quickly as possible.
Sixty percent of Americans say they side with Democrats in Congress. Thirty-seven percent of Americans say if Bush vetoes the Iraq funding bill, Congress should pass another bill without a timetable, and the same 37 percent want to keep forces in Iraq as long as they’re need. Therefore, Democrats speak for the more than 60 percent of Americans who disagree with the stay the course mentality.
In 2005, retired Lt. Gen. William Odom, who used to head the National Security Agency said the only way to stabilize the Middle East is to leave Iraq. Odom wrote that if Bush wants to bring democracy and stability to the Middle East, the only way to achieve that goal is for the US armed forces to get out of Iraq now.
Odom, is a highly respected military analysts and a prominent figure at the conservative Hudson Institute in Washington. He insists that Iraq is the worst place to fight a battle for regional stability and that the invasion of Iraq didn’t serve our interests. It turns out that Iran and al Qaeda benefited the most, and that continues to be true every day US forces remain there.
General Odom was right, it’s the greatest strategic blunder in American history. History teaches us that if we understand ourselves and true to our own national values, the prerequisites for cultural understanding are minimized. This war and the way in which we moved into Iraq are in violation of our national values.
The military situation has deteriorated to the point it’s undeniable, that this thing is not going to be won in military terms. We are not going to shoot our way into making peace between warring religious factions that have been going at it for half a millennium.
General Odom was not alone in his criticism of the invasion of Iraq. For the first time in history, numerous generals challenged the competence of the Secretary of Defense and Commander-in-Chief.
The Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki, when President Bush was elected, accurately informed Congress that the occupation of Iraq would require something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers. Shinseki's estimate was publicly dismissed by Pentagon officials. He had the courage to challenge Rumfeld’s downsizing plans, which would have made a big difference as we began reconstruction. Rumsfeld retaliated by naming General Shinseki's successor more than a year before his scheduled retirement, effectively undercutting his authority. The rest of the senior brass got the message, and have been reluctant to complained since.
Retired Gen. Wesley Clark predicted that the unilateral invasion of Iraq would supercharge recruiting for Al Qaeda.
Retired Marine Lt. Gen. Gregory Newbold a former director of operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff said: “My sincere view is that the commitment of our forces to this fight was done with a casualness and swagger that are the special province of those who have never had to execute these missions or bury the results.”
Retired Marine General Anthony Zinni established his impeccable credentials during nearly forty years of military service. After retirement, he served as Colin Powell's special envoy to the Middle East, before disagreements over the Iraq war and its probable aftermath caused him to resign. In “Battle Ready”; a segment entitled “The Obligation to Speak the Truth”, Zinni said: “In the lead-up to the Iraq war and its later conduct, I saw at minimum, true dereliction, negligence and irresponsibility; at worst, lying, incompetence, and corruption. False rationales presented as justification; a flawed strategy; lack of planning; the unnecessary alienation of our allies; the underestimation of the task; the unnecessary distraction from real threats, and the unbearable strain dumped on our overstretched military, all of these caused me to speak out.”
For speaking out Zinni was called a traitor and a turncoat by Pentagon officials. Zinni strongly disagrees with the mentality which says: “As long as guys are dying out there, it is morally reprehensible to criticize the flawed policies and tactics that put them into the predicaments.”
On October 10 2002, Zinni a former chief of U.S. Central Command repeated points he'd made during the run-up to war: “If we think there is a fast solution to changing the governance of Iraq, then we don't understand history, the nature of the country, the divisions or the underneath suppressed passions that could rise up.” It was Zinni who predicted that the Iraqi Army and security forces might melt away after the state apparatus self-destructed, leading to chaos.
Recently Zinni said: “Poor military judgment has been used throughout this mission. In my case, I was retired by the time this started, but I took issue with the faulty planning, the overoptimistic assumptions, trusting the exiles, bad decisions on the ground, inability to secure the borders; all sorts of mistakes that should not have happened, that good, common sense military judgment should not have let happen. You have one of two choices: either you speak out or you leave. If you decide to leave after you're heard and your advice not accepted, you're just going to be replaced. Somebody else is going to come in.”
Lt. Gen. Newbold and Gen. Zinni had seen the lack of planning beforehand but, Maj. Generals; Paul Eaton and John Batiste experienced the effects of the bad decisions right on the ground.
Retired Army Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton commanded the training of Iraqi security forces until 2004. He has written that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is not competent to lead our armed forces. Eaton points out that Rumsfeld's failure to build coalitions with our traditional allies, by dismissively refering to them as "old Europe". “Thus, he imposed far greater demands and risks on our military than necessary. Furthermore, he alienated our own military, by ignoring the advice of seasoned officers and denying subordinates any chance for input.” Eaton calls for Mr. Rumsfeld to step down, because: “He has shown himself incompetent strategically, operationally and tactically, and is far more than anyone responsible for what has happened to our important mission in Iraq.”
Since, Rumsfeld has presided over the Pentagon, there is a growing reluctance by experienced military men and civilians to challenge his decisions. Rumsfeld rejected the Powell Doctrine of overwhelming force and sent in just enough troops to complete the ground war against the uniformed Iraqis.
Retired Maj. Gen. John Batiste led the First Infantry Division in Iraq said: “When decisions are made without taking into account sound military recommendations, sound military decision-making, sound planning, then we're bound to make mistakes.” Batiste supports civilian control of the military, but says: “We went to war with a flawed plan that didn't account for the hard work to build the peace after we took down the regime. We also served under a Secretary of Defense who didn't understand leadership, who was abusive, who was arrogant, who didn't build a strong team.”
Retired Army Maj. Gen. Charles Swannack commanded the 82nd Airborne in Iraq stated: “I really believe that we need a new secretary of defense because Secretary Rumsfeld carries way too much baggage with him.” Swannack criticised Rumsfeld's management style: “He has micromanaged the generals who are leading our forces there; he has culpability associated with the Abu Ghraib prison scandal and rather than admitting these mistakes, he continually justifies them to the press.” Swannack, who served more than 30 years in the Army and also criticized the way the war was being run before he retired. In May 2004, while still on active duty, Swannack told the Washington Post that he thought the United States was losing strategically in Iraq.
Retired Army Maj. Gen. John Riggs the former director of Objective Force Task Force claimed: "They only need the military advice when it satisfies their agenda. I think that's a mistake, and that's why I think he should resign."
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