Afghanistan
Former senior member of the U. S. intelligence community, Michael Scheuer, had two decades of experience in national security issues. While with the CIA, he was an authority on Afghanistan. In "Imperial Hubris", he wrote: “Unless U.S. led foreign forces are massively increased and are prepared to kill liberally and remain in Afghanistan permanently, the current Afghan regime cannot survive. In Afghanistan, above all other places, familiarity with foreigners breeds not just contempt, but war to the death. The reestablishment of an Islamic regime in Kabul is as close to an inevitability as exists. One hopes that Karzai and the rest of the westernized, secular, and followerless Afghan expatriates we installed in Kabul are able to get out with their lives.”
A lengthening list of Afghan civilians accidentally killed by American military operations, a badly flawed American backed opium eradication program, and rising public disenchantment with President Hamid Karzai has led to a stronger than expected Taliban rebirth.
Afghans have a long history of hostility toward foreign troops on their territory. In the 19th-century the British and in the 20th-century the Russians learned the hard way. They have made an exception for the 21st-century Americans, who helped shake off the Taliban and promised their war-shattered country an international rebuilding effort modeled on post-World War II Marshall Plan.
After 5 years, Afghanistan's patience is running out, because our military presence is seen as focused on hunting down Al Qaeda fighters and indifferent to Afghan civilian casualties. The answer is not for Washington to scale back legitimate American objectives. Pressing the fight against Al Qaeda is essential to America's own national security.
Nevertheless, the Bush regime needs to begin talks immediately with Afghanistan's government to arrive at a mutually satisfactory agreement on basic ground rules governing American military personnel in their interactions with Afghan civilians. It should reinforce its anti-narcotics drive by developing programs, which allow farmers to find livelihoods in more constructive lines of work. Most Afghans do not want to go back to the horrors of the recent past, but we have failed to demonstrate that we care about a decent future for its people.
A lengthening list of Afghan civilians accidentally killed by American military operations, a badly flawed American backed opium eradication program, and rising public disenchantment with President Hamid Karzai has led to a stronger than expected Taliban rebirth.
Afghans have a long history of hostility toward foreign troops on their territory. In the 19th-century the British and in the 20th-century the Russians learned the hard way. They have made an exception for the 21st-century Americans, who helped shake off the Taliban and promised their war-shattered country an international rebuilding effort modeled on post-World War II Marshall Plan.
After 5 years, Afghanistan's patience is running out, because our military presence is seen as focused on hunting down Al Qaeda fighters and indifferent to Afghan civilian casualties. The answer is not for Washington to scale back legitimate American objectives. Pressing the fight against Al Qaeda is essential to America's own national security.
Nevertheless, the Bush regime needs to begin talks immediately with Afghanistan's government to arrive at a mutually satisfactory agreement on basic ground rules governing American military personnel in their interactions with Afghan civilians. It should reinforce its anti-narcotics drive by developing programs, which allow farmers to find livelihoods in more constructive lines of work. Most Afghans do not want to go back to the horrors of the recent past, but we have failed to demonstrate that we care about a decent future for its people.
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